Protective Clubs

How do African leaders cooperate through regional intergovernmental organizations (RIOs) to manage political and security threats? Do the particular interests of heads of state really matter for explaining how these organizations address crises and intervene in their members' domestic affairs? Protective Clubs reveals how presidents across Africa cooperate in RIOs to protect themselves from threats, such as military coups. Cottiero argues that heads of state concerned with their personal survival often treat RIOs as bases for organizing, in essence, mutual protection clubs based on reciprocity. Leaders who cooperate and maintain 'good standing' with co-members are more likely to receive back-up during crises, while leaders who destabilized co-members are more likely to be abandoned or punished. Employing original datasets on security interventions and leader exile, interviews, and Nigerian presidential archive records, Protective Clubs shows how collusion among leaders matters not just for particular leaders, but for regional stability and democracy.