Description
While it is commonly accepted that some mental states are felt or phenomenally conscious by nature, the view is often reserved for such things as pains and other simple bodily sensations. This book on the other hand provocatively argues that all mental states have phenomenal natures, including more complex mental states like beliefs and desires. The author’s view—what he calls the Phenomenal Mind Theory—holds that mental states are nothing but the way they feel or phenomenally appear to us when we have them. The first part of the book spells out and defends the Phenomenal Mind Theory. The book then proceeds to give a phenomenological characterization of different mental state types, and to advance a novel way of thinking about the structure of the phenomenal mind. This in turn leads to a rigorous defence of the claim that phenomenality is the "mark of the mental". Finally, the last part of the book shows how the Phenomenal Mind Theory implies the falsity of different types of physicalism and the truth of mind-body dualism. The Phenomenal Nature of Mind will appeal to scholars and advanced students working in philosophy of mind, phenomenology, and philosophy of consciousness.