Description
Through a comparative study of dual-class share structures (DCSS) regulation in the US, the UK, and Mainland China, the book investigates why formally similar listing reforms produce strikingly different outcomes across jurisdictions. It develops the concept of regulatory alignment: the fit between formal rules and the reform objectives, regulatory philosophy, institutional design, and market conditions of the jurisdictions. Theoretically, the book advances a two-stage framework of inquiry. The first stage assesses whether the three architectural dimensions of regulatory philosophy, institutional design, and reform objectives are aligned around the reallocated model that disclosure-based reform affects. The second stage examines whether the market features on which the reallocated model depends are present in the jurisdiction where the reform operates. Furthermore, the book provides a reform roadmap for China. It addresses first-stage architectural reforms, second-stage market-features development, and DCSS-specific technical recommendations that operate within the existing listing-rule architecture. The book is intended for researchers, students, regulators, and practitioners working in corporate law, securities regulation, and comparative corporate governance.