Description
Positive Epistemology brings together leading philosophers to explore a neglected question at the heart of epistemology: when are we required to believe, rather than merely permitted to do so? While much epistemological theorizing has focused on avoiding error and identifying the conditions under which belief is prohibited, the contributors to this volume investigate the positive dimensions of epistemic evaluation, including obligations to believe, intellectual courage, inquiry, attention, and the costs of excessive doubt. The volume examines foundational debates about epistemic normativity, the nature of belief, the relationship between epistemic, moral, and practical reasons, and the social and political significance of skepticism and suspension of judgment. Bringing together both defenders and critics of positive epistemology, it offers a comprehensive introduction to an emerging area of research while advancing several important new theoretical developments. This book will be of interest to researchers, graduate students, and advanced undergraduate students in epistemology, ethics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of religion, and social and political philosophy.