Description
This book examines how China has responded to one of the most enduring security challenges in East Asia: North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Spanning the post-Cold War era to recent nuclear crises, it addresses a central paradox: why has China consistently opposed North Korea's nuclear development while simultaneously avoiding policies that could destabilize the regime? It argues that China’s policy is driven by the imperative to balance two intricately connected yet often conflicting objectives—maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and promoting denuclearization. This tension has compelled China to sustain engagement with North Korea as its overarching strategic approach while continually recalibrating the balance between cooperation, pressure, and diplomatic mediation. By examining the first and second nuclear crises, the Six-Party Talks, North Korea’s nuclear tests, and subsequent periods of heightened tension and diplomatic engagement, the book identifies three distinct patterns: soft engagement, preventive engagement, and hard engagement. Drawing on Chinese, U.S., and South Korean sources, the study offers a systematic analysis of the evolution, logic, and variation of China’s engagement with North Korea. The book will be valuable for scholars and students of international security, Chinese foreign policy, and Korean politics.