{"title":"Books by Peter Carruthers","description":null,"products":[{"product_id":"9780198843702","title":"Human and Animal Minds","description":"The continuities between human and animal minds are increasingly well understood. This has led many people to make claims about consciousness in animals, which has often been taken to be crucial for their moral standing. Peter Carruthers argues compellingly that there is no fact of the matter to be discovered, and that the question of animal consciousness is of no scientific or ethical significance. Carruthers offers solutions to two related puzzles. The first is about the place of phenomenal--or felt--consciousness in the natural order. Consciousness is shown to comprise fine-grained nonconceptual contents that are \"globally broadcast\" to a wide range of cognitive systems for reasoning, decision-making, and verbal report. Moreover, the so-called \"hard\" problem of consciousness results merely from the distinctive first-person concepts we can use when thinking about such contents. No special non-physical properties--no so-called \"qualia\"--are involved. The second puzzle concerns the distribution of phenomenal consciousness across the animal kingdom. Carruthers shows that there is actually no fact of the matter, because thoughts about consciousness in other creatures require us to project our first-person concepts into their minds; but such projections fail to result in determinate truth-conditions when those minds are significantly unlike our own. This upshot, however, doesn't matter. It doesn't matter for science, because no additional property enters the world as one transitions from creatures that are definitely incapable of phenomenal consciousness to those that definitely are (namely, ourselves). And on many views it doesn't matter for ethics, either, since concern for animals can be grounded in sympathy, which requires only third-person understanding of the desires and emotions of the animals in question, rather than in first-person empathy.","brand":"Gardners","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":56227084829045,"sku":"9780198843702","price":27.49,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0612\/7193\/3106\/files\/9780198843702_732ea60f-df0e-4ef9-a205-ca97167a6576.jpg?v=1786012265"},{"product_id":"9781009585767","title":"Explaining our Actions","description":"We often explain our actions and those of others using a commonsense framework of perceptions, beliefs, desires, emotions, decisions, and intentions. In his thoughtful new book, Peter Carruthers scrutinizes this everyday explanation for our actions, while also examining the explanatory framework through the lens of cutting-edge cognitive science. He shows that the 'standard model' of belief–desire psychology (developed, in fact, with scant regard for science) is only partly valid; that there are more types of action and action-explanation than the model allows; and that both ordinary folk and armchair philosophers are importantly mistaken about the types of mental state that the human mind contains. His book will be of great value to all those who rely in their work on assumptions drawn from commonsense psychology, whether in philosophy of mind, epistemology, moral psychology, ethics, or psychology itself. It will also be attractive to anyone with an interest in human motivation.","brand":"Gardners","offers":[{"title":"Hardback","offer_id":56295740670325,"sku":"9781009585767","price":33.99,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0612\/7193\/3106\/files\/9781009585767.jpg?v=1792511669"},{"product_id":"9780198906131","title":"Human Motives","description":"Motivational hedonism (often called “psychological hedonism”) claims that everything we do is done in pursuit of pleasure (in the widest sense) and to avoid pain and displeasure (again, in the widest sense). Although perennially attractive, many philosophers and experimental psychologists have claimed to refute it. Human Motives shows how decision-science and the recent science of affect can be used to construct a form of motivational hedonism that evades all previous critiques. On this view, we take decisions by anticipating and responding affectively to the alternatives, with the pleasure \/ displeasure component of affect constituting the common currency of decision-making. But we do not have to believe that the alternatives will bring us pleasure or displeasure in the future. Rather, those feelings get bound into and become parts of the future-directed representation of the options, rendering the latter attractive or repulsive. Much then depends on what pleasure and displeasure really are. If they are intrinsically good or bad properties of experience, for example, then motivational hedonism results. Carruthers argues, in contrast, that the best account is a representational one: pleasure represents its object (nonconceptually, in a perception-like manner) as good, and displeasure represents it (nonconceptually) as bad. The result is pluralism about human motivation, making room for both genuine altruism and intrinsic motives of duty. Clearly written and deeply scientifically informed, Human Motives has implications for many areas of philosophy and cognitive science, and will be of interest to anyone wanting to understand the foundations of human motivation.","brand":"Gardners","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":56311615390069,"sku":"9780198906131","price":32.99,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0612\/7193\/3106\/files\/9780198906131_b20f6f08-41fb-4c3d-b7e6-6045340a8414.jpg?v=1786012921"},{"product_id":"innateness-in-mind","title":"Innateness in Mind","description":"This Element focuses on contemporary forms of nativism (belief in innateness), which mostly concern the existence of domain-specific learning mechanisms with innate structure and content. After sketching some innate capacities that are widely believed to be shared with other animals, the Element thereafter discusses a number of (alleged) distinctively-human ones. One concerns a faculty of language, another our capacity for representing the mental states of others (and derivatively, ourselves). It then turns to discuss some proposed innate adaptations that support culture. These include a number of learning biases, as well as affective learning mechanisms that enable swift acquisition of cultural values. The final two sections then discuss 'tribal psychology.' This may include an innate disposition to stereotype social groups as well as innate 'tribal' motivations (both positive and negative). The over-arching thesis of the Element is that human nature might best be thought of as culture-enabling nature.","brand":"Gardners","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":57483514478965,"sku":"9781009506083","price":18.0,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0612\/7193\/3106\/files\/9781009506083.jpg?v=1786178685"}],"url":"https:\/\/backstory.london\/collections\/author-peter-carruthers.oembed","provider":"Backstory","version":"1.0","type":"link"}